

The Greatest Story Seldom Told: The Central Role of African American Students in Achieving Racial Equality

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“Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law. [...] I am [...] asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public—hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar establishments.”¹

With these remarks in a televised address to the American public, President John F. Kennedy announced the initiation of broad civil rights legislation on June 11, 1963. Arguably, this was the turning point of the Civil Rights Movement. Kennedy’s proposed legislation would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It outlawed discrimination in employment and public accommodations on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin. It also included voting reform as well as provisions that would accelerate the pace of school desegregation. Enactment of this legislation paved the way for the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which provided most African Americans in the South an actual right to vote for the first time. Initiation of sweeping federal civil rights legislation would have been unimaginable just three years earlier to the student leaders who independently initiated lunch counter sit-in campaigns in Greensboro, North Carolina, and Nashville, Tennessee. Members of the King-centric historiographical school such as Adam Fairclough paint Martin Luther King Jr. as the most important figure in shifting the Kennedy administration’s stance on civil rights. Historians such as Clayborne Carson, on the other hand, argue that students were the primary force pushing the movement forward in the early Sixties. A close analysis of the events that caused President John F. Kennedy and his brother and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to move from ambivalence on Civil Rights to champions of the legislation that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates that student leaders played a more important role than even Carson has contended.

In 1865, Union victory in the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments presaged equality for African Americans in the South. In reality, nearly a century later, the segregationist Jim Crow system made African Americans in the South second class citizens. Although many Jim Crow policies violated federal laws, African Americans in the South were barred from, among other places, movie theaters, restaurants, lunch counters and public swimming pools. Most could not even register to vote due to policies such as poll taxes and literacy tests designed to deny them suffrage. The successful Montgomery bus boycotts of 1955, which desegregated Montgomery’s bus system, catapulted Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement to the national stage. Hoping to continue the momentum from the bus boycotts, King formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in January, 1957, with the goal that ministers and other local leaders across the South would coordinate to lead similar protests and voter registration movements.² By 1960, however, despite trying to start several voter registration campaigns, the SCLC had no major accomplishments. In July 1959, SCLC Executive Director Ella Baker wrote in a memorandum to King that the SCLC “[was] losing the initiative in the Civil Rights Struggle.”³ Prospects for sweeping federal legislation to provide African Americans in the South truly equal rights, and correct the failures of the post-

Civil War Reconstruction period were dim. Democrats, such as President John F. Kennedy, who condemned segregation and inequality for African Americans, were reluctant to act, understanding that passing such legislation would mean losing the support of Southern white voters that was important to electoral success at the federal level.

King-centric historians contend that King's leadership as a strategist and orator was the most important factor in the success of the Civil Rights Movement. Historian Adam Fairclough represents this perspective, contending that "in terms of influence and accomplishment, King outstripped all other black leaders and would-be leaders."⁴ Fairclough's work supports the King-centric narrative that has dominated popular perception of the Civil Rights Movement from its inception. This narrative was to a significant extent institutionalized when Congress and President Reagan established Martin Luther King Day in 1983. The holiday and "myth" it represents "not only exaggerates King's historical importance but also distorts his actual, considerable contribution to the movement," according to Dr. Clayborne Carson, founder and director of Stanford University's Martin Luther King Jr. Research and Education Institute.⁵ Carson argues that student organizers drove the movement forward during the crucial 1960-1963 period. He writes, "[the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the primary student civil rights organization, (SNCC)] was at the center of a movement that changed the nation."⁶ To support his contention, Carson documents the student-organized 1960 sit-in campaign, the aggressive 1961 Freedom Rides, and SNCC's unique strategy of community organizing in the Deep South. Carson agrees with Fairclough's assessment that "by all accounts, SCLC's protests [in Birmingham in 1963] were pivotal in persuading the Kennedy administration to abandon its executive-action strategy in favor of legislation," and that the Children's Crusade, in which thousands of African American children protesters provoked "the mass arrest of children and the use of fire hoses and police dogs [that] was publicized the world all over," was the critical component of the Birmingham campaign.⁷ Carson argues that, "the Children's Crusade turned the tide of the movement [...] if he [Martin Luther King] hadn't won, there probably wouldn't have been an 'I Have a Dream' speech or a Man of the Year award or a Nobel Peace Prize in 1964."⁸ Where Carson and Fairclough differ is that Fairclough makes the implicit assumption made by many King-centric historians that all SCLC successes should be attributed to King, treating the Children's Crusade as King's strategic victory.⁹ Carson, on the other hand, recognizes that it was student leader James Bevel, who had only recently left SNCC to join the SCLC, who on his own initiative thought of, organized, and executed the Children's Crusade.¹⁰ Carson does not make a detailed analysis of the contributions made by student leaders that caused the Kennedy administration to change course to propose sweeping legislation. This analysis, which follows, supports Carson's contention that, above all, it was the direct action nonviolent protests organized and executed by student leaders that accelerated federal legislation to ensure equal rights for African Americans in the South.

As will be discussed in detail below, national news coverage of the violent reaction provoked by SCLC's 1963 Birmingham campaign was an important reason the Kennedy administration decided to change course and propose sweeping Civil Rights legislation. However, as of January 1960, the SCLC had not come close to replicating the success of the 1955 Montgomery bus boycotts. In September 1959, SCLC Executive Director Ella Baker observed in her "Report of the Executive Director" that the SCLC needed to develop "potential leaders" who could organize "a vital movement of nonviolent direct mass action."¹¹ Carson argues that "within months of

Baker's remarks, the lunch counter desegregation sit-ins [...] ignited the type of movement she advocated, but black college students, rather than King and his SCLC colleagues, were spearheading the new movement.”¹² On February 1, 1960, four students in Greensboro, North Carolina, started the sit-in movement by trying to order a meal at a local Woolworth's and refusing to leave when they were denied service. Two weeks later, students in Nashville who had independently been planning their own sit-in campaign, began a three-month long campaign that became the first to desegregate the lunch counters of a major Southern city. The Nashville sit-ins would emerge as the most important. They originated when James Lawson, a Vanderbilt graduate student who had studied Gandhi's nonviolent protest philosophy in India, began teaching workshops in nonviolent direct action to students attending nearby historically black universities.¹³ The students he trained—including Diane Nash, James Bevel, and John Lewis—would go on to become some of the movement's most important student leaders. Inspired by the campaigns in Greensboro and Nashville, by the fall of 1960, sit-in demonstrations led by students would take place in at least 69 cities in all Southern states with the exception of Mississippi (see Appendix A).¹⁴ These movements successfully utilized a strategy of nonviolent direct action in which organizers used large numbers of demonstrators to deliberately violate a targeted segregation policy—whether it be segregation in lunch counters, restaurants, or movie theaters. In Nashville, a dozen or so students would sit in at a targeted lunch counter. When these students were arrested, dozens more students were ready to take their places. Practicing Gandhian techniques, when heckled or beaten, the students refused to reply in kind. Their nonviolent direct action strategy proved to be very effective. By the end of the summer of 1960, 27 southern cities had desegregated their lunch counters.¹⁵ These successes transformed the direction of the movement. As Kenneth T. Andrews and Michael Bigg argue, “While civil rights advocates [such as the leaders of the SCLC, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)] had been relying primarily on litigation and organization building, such tangible victories [of the successful student sit-ins] elevated protest as the central strategy of the movement in the years to follow.”¹⁶

Unlike the SCLC, CORE almost immediately moved to implement the students' nonviolent direct action strategy. On May 4th, 1961, CORE started a “Freedom Ride” through the South to demonstrate to Americans that Jim Crow segregation on interstate buses persisted despite the Supreme Court's *Boynton* holding that such restrictions were illegal. The CORE riders met extreme violence in Alabama. In Anniston, one of the two buses was firebombed by an angry white mob (miraculously no one was killed) and, soon after, the riders on the other bus were brutally beaten by a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) mob in Birmingham. In the face of this fierce resistance, CORE decided to discontinue its campaign.¹⁷ Learning this, Nashville student leaders Diane Nash, John Lewis, and James Bevel, fearing that stopping the Freedom Rides could derail the entire movement by showing segregationists that they could use force to stop nonviolent direct action, rallied student veterans of the Nashville sit-ins to continue the rides.¹⁸ Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Executive Assistant and friend John Seigenthaler implored 23-year-old Diane Nash to abandon the rides, fearing further violence.¹⁹ Nash refused to back down. In an interview Nash recalls, “Some of the students gave me sealed letters to be mailed in case they were killed. That's how prepared they were for death.”²⁰ The Nashville riders predictably met extreme violence at their first stop in Montgomery, Alabama. Two riders, John Lewis and Jim Zwerg, were almost beaten to death.²¹ The violent attack forced Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Department of Justice for the first time to deploy federal marshals to try to control a

civil rights crisis.²² The attacks garnered national press attention, starting the education of the rest of the country about the reality of the Jim Crow South. As one example, the *Washington Post* ran a story accompanied by a photo of bloodied Freedom Rider Jim Zwerg above the fold on its front page (see Appendix 2).²³

The Freedom Rides also started the education of Robert Kennedy, who admitted that he did not “give a shit” about Civil Rights before he became Attorney General.²⁴ Kennedy had to be personally impacted when he learned that that Siegenthaler, whom he had sent to Alabama to try to manage the situation, had himself almost been killed.²⁵ The Freedom Rides, prompted the Kennedy Justice Department to ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to issue regulations ordering the desegregation of all interstate travel facilities, which the ICC passed several months later.²⁶ In a 1985 interview, Robert Kennedy’s Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Burke Marshall, commented on the effectiveness of the students’ strategy: “The Freedom Rides [were] a catalyst to spur the Department of Justice to go to the ICC and ask the ICC to implement through new regulations [...] this statutory rule that prohibited racial segregation in the state bus travel, including the stations.”²⁷ This explanation is made more credible by the fact that it is against Marshall’s interest. He and the Department of Justice would appear better had the instruction to the ICC already been in process on the Department of Justice’s own initiative. The Nashville leaders and courageous Freedom Riders had proven that a strategy of using direct action nonviolent protest to provoke segregationist violence could succeed in obtaining federal intervention if it obtained national press coverage. The success of the student-led sit-ins, followed by the even greater success of the student-led Freedom Rides, provided a template SNCC leaders would apply in dozens of cities over the next few years.²⁸ The success and organic growth of these student-led protests supports Carson’s thesis that “if Kennedy had never lived, the black struggle would have followed a course of development similar to the one it did.”²⁹

In a letter to a supporter, King acknowledged that he had learned from the students’ successful Freedom Rides: “The world seldom believes the horror stories of history until they are documented via mass media. Certainly, there would not have been enough pressure to warrant a ruling by the ICC had [the Freedom Ride confrontation] not been so well publicized.”³⁰ King and the SCLC recognized that to conduct successful campaigns and to remain relevant, the SCLC needed to bring on board visionary student leaders to help organize future protests.³¹ To this end, the SCLC persuaded James Bevel and Diane Nash to leave SNCC to join the SCLC.³² The SCLC also brought on James Lawson, who had been the key adviser to the Nashville students during the sit-in campaign.³³ These moves, underappreciated in the Civil Rights scholarship, would prove critical to the SCLC successes in Birmingham (and, later, Selma).

After a largely unsuccessful attempt to challenge segregationist policies in Albany, Georgia, King and the SCLC needed to be effective in their next campaign. The leaders chose Birmingham primarily because they calculated its hot-tempered, ardently segregationist police chief, Bull Connor, would react to their protests with the violence necessary to gain national press coverage. SCLC Chief of Staff Wyatt Tee Walker recalled looking back on the Birmingham campaign, “We knew that when we came to Birmingham that if Bull Connor was still in control, he would do something to benefit our movement [...] [We] decided that Birmingham would be our target because we felt that after Albany we had to take on what

represented the symbol of the inflexible South. [We] knew that there had been no real dramatization to the nation of what segregation was like and Birmingham would provide us with that kind of platform.”³⁴ As further evidence that it aimed to provoke segregationist violence as the Freedom Rides had, the SCLC named their direct action campaign of sit-ins and marches “Project C” for “confrontation.”³⁵ The campaign started in March, 1963, and was able to attract a small number of demonstrators to march and sit-in. By late April, however, the campaign was faltering.³⁶ According to local pastor John King, who aided the SCLC with their campaign, King had urgently told him on April 26th, “You know we’ve got to get something going. The press is leaving, we’ve got to get going.”³⁷ King and the SCLC were under great pressure to achieve major desegregation gains in Birmingham. Since its founding in 1957, the SCLC had no major accomplishments. It was in danger of becoming irrelevant. One of the problems the SCLC faced was that they had run out of Birmingham citizens willing to demonstrate. “We needed more troops. [...] We had scraped the bottom of the barrel of adults who could go,” recalled Walker.³⁸

What saved the campaign was James Bevel’s planning and execution of the “Children’s Crusade” which garnered the press attention and national outrage needed to force change in Birmingham and influence the Kennedy administration. In an interview, Bevel recalled, “My position was you can’t get the dialogues you need with a few. So the strategy was, okay, let’s use thousands of people who won’t create an economic crisis because they’re off the job: the high school students.”³⁹ On his own initiative, Bevel, with the help of Nash, Wyatt Walker, and Dorothy Cotton, had been conducting workshops in nonviolence in local high schools to prepare students to march.⁴⁰ Bevel explained that to get maximum participation, “We started organizing the prom queens of the high schools, the basketball stars, the football stars, to get the influence and power leaders involved. They in turn got all the other students involved.”⁴¹ In a case of success begetting success, in his workshops, Bevel would play students an *NBC White Paper* episode about the Nashville Sit-Ins to instruct students on the principles of nonviolent direct action that he and the other Nashville leaders had used so effectively three years earlier.⁴² On May 2, when the students high school age and even younger were scheduled to march, King had not yet made a decision on whether to allow them to go.⁴³ Bevel and Walker decided that the students would march anyway. With over five hundred students getting arrested that day, press attention returned to Birmingham, and King gave his support to Bevel’s idea.⁴⁴ The next day, over two thousand young students marched. This time, Bull Connor used police dogs and fire hoses to disperse the young marchers and their adult onlookers. The violence garnered massive media attention, with graphic photographs making the front page of the *New York Times*.⁴⁵ It should be noted that historians differ on whether King approved of the initial launch of the Children’s Crusade or even of the workshops for students. In his claim that “in Birmingham, King broke the political logjam and delivered a hammer-blow against white supremacy,” Fairclough ignores evidence that King had little or nothing to do with the planning of the Children’s Crusade, the event that Fairclough cites as having the greatest impact. Fairclough does not even mention Bevel.⁴⁶ Even Carson asserts that the Children’s Crusade was a strategic victory for King because King made the crucial decision to allow what he knew would be a controversial campaign.⁴⁷ According to Eskew and Garrow, however, this is not what the historical record shows. In either case, the success of the Birmingham campaign should be regarded as a success primarily of the student-led movement, even though it was conducted by the SCLC with strong support from local organizers. First, the campaign succeeded only because the SCLC had persuaded the experienced and visionary student leader James Bevel to join its

team. The Children's Crusade that Bevel orchestrated that saved the campaign was a culmination of the accumulated wisdom he acquired by leading and participating in the Nashville Sit-Ins and the Freedom Rides. Second, the campaign succeeded because the SCLC decided to adopt the nonviolent direct action strategy that had been developed and implemented successfully by students leaders.

The strategy used effectively by the students starting with the Freedom Rides—provoking violence against nonviolent protesters to gain national press attention—had been deployed by Bevel in Birmingham and had its intended effect. President Kennedy was personally appalled by what had happened, saying that the *New York Times* photos had “made him sick” in a recorded White House meeting.⁴⁸ This response was a marked change for a president who had previously been ambivalent about the Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, after the violence against student demonstrators gained extensive national press coverage, Americans became much more supportive of federal action on Civil Rights. Remarkably, polling showed Americans who ranked civil rights as the nation's most urgent issue jumped from 4% to 52% after Birmingham.⁴⁹ The dramatic increase in concern about Civil Rights provided President Kennedy more political leeway to attempt to pass civil rights legislation. Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff contend in their book *The Race Beat*, “For white northerners, the cameras provided incontrovertible evidence of American unfairness, inhumanity, and brutality. Any suggestion by southern whites that their Jim Crow laws and lifestyle were moral, legal, or practical, or that the South's Negroes were fundamentally happy, was demolished by the images.”⁵⁰ As one example supporting this interpretation, President Kennedy received a letter from California's governor Pat Brown and other California citizens asking him to take action in Birmingham.⁵¹ Looking back on his decision to ask Congress for the Civil Rights bill, President Kennedy called it “Bull Connor's Bill,” for the police chief of Birmingham who had set the dogs and hoses on the child protestors.⁵²

Carson and Fairclough agree that Birmingham was pivotal. Birmingham, however, was not pivotal in isolation. It was only pivotal in the context of other factors. Perhaps the most important of these other factors was that civil rights protests exploded in the Spring of 1963 independent of Birmingham. In its “Review” of its activities in Civil Rights in 1963, the Department of Justice reported that the “national concern for civil rights accelerated sharply in 1963,” counting 2063 civil rights demonstrations in 315 cities in 40 states.⁵³ Supporting the Department of Justice's findings, the Southern Regional Council estimated that over 20,000 people were arrested in 1963 during protests in 11 Southern states, compared to about 3,600 arrests during nonviolent protests prior to the fall of 1961.⁵⁴ In its 1963 Review, the Department of Justice reported that, in addition to its intervention in Birmingham, it sent officials to a number of other cities “to help resolve racial conflicts peacefully.”⁵⁵ According to Carson, all five protests expressly listed in the Review were supported by SNCC and were either prior to or contemporaneous with the Birmingham campaign (see cities highlighted in Appendix 4).⁵⁶ While Carson does not attempt to explain how student-led protests influenced Kennedy Administration policy, his research supports the argument that student supported protests, combined with Birmingham, caused Marshall to logically conclude after he returned from Birmingham, where he had been sent to negotiate with local leaders, that, as historian Clay Risen put it, “the current non-strategy of putting out spot-fires, was untenable.”⁵⁷ In a 1964 interview, Marshall recalls that the Kennedy administration shared his concerns: “My own judgment, [and] the judgment of the Attorney

General, we both saw it in the same way, was that for the future [...], after Birmingham [which] was already a terrible problem [...] was going to get worse and worse and worse and had to be dealt with.”⁵⁸ On Friday, May 17, on a flight with Robert Kennedy to Asheville, North Carolina, Marshall and Department of Justice colleagues “brought up the idea of a new civil rights bill, and they found that the attorney general was on board with their thoughts.”⁵⁹ From this point, events moved quickly. Robert Kennedy instructed his team to draft an omnibus civil rights bill over the weekend ready to present to the President.⁶⁰ On Monday, May 20, Robert Kennedy and Marshall presented the President with a memo with the options for a possible bill.⁶¹ As when Marshall had presented the idea to Robert Kennedy, John F. Kennedy was receptive. Though some of the President’s political aids were against it, fearing that it might lose the President political support in the 1964 reelection campaign, the President and Attorney General agreed that the bill needed a robust public accommodations law alongside school desegregation and voting rights.⁶² Marshall recalls that the President’s stance on this was shaped by the nonviolent direct action protests that had been happening since 1960. “The President was acutely aware of the intensity of feeling about public accommodations [...] Sit-ins had been going on since 1960. [...] that [public accommodations] was *the* problem in Birmingham.”⁶³ President Kennedy decided to announce the bill in a national television address on June 11 after he deployed the Alabama National Guard to compel the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, to admit its first African American student. Although the speech appeared almost perfectly timed after the success in Tuscaloosa, Marshall contends that the decision to announce legislation had already been made. According to Marshall, the discussion in the administration at the time was a question of “when rather than whether.”⁶⁴

The bill passed in Congress a little over a year later, July 2, 1964, under President Johnson. It made segregation in public spaces officially illegal and ended employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin under the law. It also contained provisions to accelerate school desegregation and to strengthen voting rights for African Americans. As Risen writes, “It reached deep into the social fabric of the nation to refashion structures of racial order and domination that had held for almost a century—and it worked. [...] The act put the political, economic, and moral power of the federal government firmly behind black America, in a single step demolishing white supremacy’s stranglehold on public policy.”⁶⁵ This legislation was primarily achieved by African American students who, through shrewd tactics and willingness to put their lives on the line, made it impossible for the federal government not to act. Recognizing the students’ contributions is not intended to minimize the contributions of Dr. King. King’s imprint on the Civil Rights Movement is everywhere. As a minor example, it was King who recommended that James Lawson pursue his graduate studies in the South where he could contribute more to the movement. Thus, King deserves some credit even for the Nashville sit-ins and the development of leaders such as Bevel, Nash, and Lewis. As Carson observes, without King, the achievements of the movement would probably not have occurred “as quickly and certainly not as peacefully, nor with as universal a significance.”⁶⁶ King also deserves credit for adopting the students’ tactics in his later campaigns, hiring student leaders like James Bevel, and effectively communicating the movement’s goals to the entire nation. It is important, however, that the students be credited for their achievements. The story of how college-age students in 1960 recognized appalling injustice, refused to live under its conditions any longer, and persisted in tearing down that injustice without resorting to violence is arguably one of the brightest shining moments in American history.

Appendix 1




Figure 2. Map Showing Sit-Ins in the American South, February 1 to April 14, 1960

Andrews and Biggs, "The Dynamics," 759.

Appendix 2



Freedom Rider James Zwerg after being beaten by a mob in Montgomery, AL.

VOL. CXII..No. 38,451. © 1963 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY.
 Times Edition, New York, N. Y. NEW YORK, SATURDAY, MAY 4, 1963. TEN CENTS

**HAITIANS PLACED
UNDER ARMY RULE;
CURFEW IMPOSED**

Duvalier Tightens His Hold Through Country—Capital

CURE HITS DIPLOMATS

O.A.S. Team Confers With Dominicans — Fighting Near Border Reported

By RICHARD EDEL
Special to The New York Times
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti,
May 3—Port-au-Prince was the

The order, in a decree by President Francisco Deauler,

The order had no immediate

[At Santa Domingo, where the inter-American investigation went Thursday night]

President Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic informed them of the Haitian, martial-law actions. Santo Domingo had unconfirmed reports of

Diplomats Concerned
As during all of last week, the sidewalks of Port-au-Prince, instead of being jammed and

clubsters, were merely ill and pedestrians looked as if they took no pleasure in being there. The diplomatic corps here was attempting to find out whether its members could obtain special


passing under the curtain in pursuit of their quarry. Several members of audience were reported planning to insist on this. One observer remarked that

could make much difference since the streets were deserted after dark for fear of scuffle with men at roadblocks and since "there are no coastguards."

There had been fears that the departure of the five-nation committee named by the Council of the Organization of

American States in Washington last weekend, which had come to

Appendix 4



Memorandum, "A Review"

Notes

¹ John F. Kennedy, "Televised Address to the Nation on Civil Rights," speech, June 11, 1963, video file, 13:41, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 4, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org>

² Ella J. Baker to Martin Luther King et al., memorandum, "Memorandum," July 2, 1959, accessed May 15, 2019, <https://www.crmvet.org>

³ Kenneth T. Andrews and Michael Biggs, "The Dynamics of Protest Diffusion: Movement Organizations, Social Networks, and News Media in the 1960 Sit-Ins," *American Sociological Review* 71, no. 5 (October 2006): 753, JSTOR.

⁴ Adam Fairclough, "Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Quest for Nonviolent Social Change," *Phylon* 47, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 193, JSTOR.

⁵ Clayborne Carson, "Martin Luther King, Jr.: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle," *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 2 (September 1987): 489.

⁶ Clayborne Carson, *SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960's* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 1.

⁷ Fairclough, "Martin Luther," 188.

⁸ Clayborne Carson, interview by Lottie L. Joiner, *Daily Beast*, last modified May 2, 2013, accessed May 16, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com>

⁹ Fairclough, "Martin Luther," 186.

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- ¹⁰ Clayborne Carson, "Between Contending Forces: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the African American Freedom Struggle," *OAH Magazine of History* 19, no. 1 (January 2005): 19, JSTOR.
- ¹¹ Baker, "Report of the Executive Director" 16 May –29 September, quoted in Clayborne Carson, comp., *Threshold of a New Decade, January 1959 December 1960*, vol. 5, *The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 19.
- ¹² Carson, "Between Contending," 17.
- ¹³ David Halberstam, *The Children* (New York, NY: Fawcett Books, 1998), 60.
- ¹⁴ Andrews and Biggs, "The Dynamics," 759.
- ¹⁵ "Why Some Areas Solve 'Sit-Ins,'" *Chicago Defender*, July 2, 1960, quoted in Christopher W. Schmidt, "The Sit-In Movement," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History, Last modified July 30, 2018, Accessed April 22, 2019.
- ¹⁶ Andrews and Biggs, "The Dynamics," 754.
- ¹⁷ Halberstam, *The Children*, 265.
- ¹⁸ Diane Nash, interview, in *Voices of Freedom*, ed. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1990), 82.
- ¹⁹ Halberstam, *The Children*, 286.
- ²⁰ Nash, interview, 82.
- ²¹ Halberstam, *The Children*, 312.
- ²² Steven Levingston, *Kennedy and King* (New York, NY: Hachette Books, 2017), 168.
- ²³ May 21, 1961: Washington Post runs "marshals-to-Alabama" front-page story on violence in Montgomery, along with photo of bloodied Freedom Rider, Jim Zwerg, photograph, accessed May 16, 2019, <https://www.pophistorydig.com>.
- ²⁴ Todd S. Purdum, *An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Two Presidents, Two Parties, and the Battle for the Civil Rights Act of 1964* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2014), 67.
- ²⁵ Halberstam, *The Children*, 318.
- ²⁶ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 159.
- ²⁷ Burke Marshall, interview by Blackside, Inc., Washington University Libraries, Film and Media Archive, accessed April 22, 2019, <http://digital.wustl.edu>.
- ²⁸ Carson, *SNCC and the Black*, 90.
- ²⁹ Carson, "Martin Luther," 452.
- ³⁰ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 171.
- ³¹ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 188.
- ³² Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 188.
- ³³ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 168.
- ³⁴ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 227.
- ³⁵ Wyatt Tee Walker, "Interview with Wyatt Tee Walker," by Callie Crossley, Eyes on the Prize Interviews, last modified October 11, 1985, accessed May 16, 2019, <http://digital.wustl.edu/>.
- ³⁶ But for Birmingham, Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 247.
- ³⁷ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 253.
- ³⁸ Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 247.
- ³⁹ Bevel, interview, 131.
- ⁴⁰ James Bevel, interview, in *Voices of Freedom*, ed. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1990), 131.
- ⁴¹ Bevel, interview, 131.
- ⁴² James Bevel, "Interview with James Bevel," by Blackside Inc., Washington University Libraries, accessed April 22, 2019, <http://repository.wustl.edu>.
- ⁴³ Glenn T. Eskew, *But for Birmingham* (Chapel Hill, VA: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 263; Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 246.
- ⁴⁴ Eskew, *But for Birmingham*, 264; Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 249.

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- ⁴⁵ Foster Hailey, "Dogs and Hoses Repulse Negroes at Birmingham," *New York Times* (New York, NY), May 4, 1963, 1, accessed May 14, 2019.
- ⁴⁶ Fairclough, "Martin Luther," 188.
- ⁴⁷ Carson, "Between Contending," 19.
- ⁴⁸ President (1961-1963 : Kennedy). Office of the Personal Secretary. , 1961 - 1963, "Meetings: Tape 85. Americans for Democratic Action, 4 May 1963," MP3 audio file, 30:37, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed May 14, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org>.
- ⁴⁹ Levingston, *Kennedy and King*, 109.
- ⁵⁰ Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, *The Race Beat* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006), 321.
- ⁵¹ Edmund G. Brown to John F. Kennedy, May 1963, accessed April 22, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org>
- ⁵² Evan Thomas, *Robert Kennedy His Life* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 246.
- ⁵³ Memorandum, "A Review of the Activities of the Department of Justice in Civil Rights, 1963," n.d., accessed May 16, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org>.
- ⁵⁴ Memorandum by Southern Regional Council, "Civil Rights: Year-End Summary," December 31, 1963, accessed May 16, 2019, <https://www.crmvet.org>.
- ⁵⁵ Memorandum, "A Review."
- ⁵⁶ Carson, *SNCC and the Black*, 86-90.
- ⁵⁷ Clay Risen, *The Bill of the Century* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2014), 46.
- ⁵⁸ Burke Marshall, "Burke Marshall Oral History Interview," by Anthony Lewis, last modified June 20, 1964, accessed May 15, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org>
- ⁵⁹ Risen, *The Bill*, 46; Marshall, "Burke Marshall," interview.
- ⁶⁰ Risen, *The Bill*, 47.
- ⁶¹ Risen, *The Bill*, 47.
- ⁶² Marshall, "Burke Marshall," interview.
- ⁶³ Marshall, "Burke Marshall," interview.
- ⁶⁴ Marshall, "Burke Marshall," interview.
- ⁶⁵ Risen, *The Bill*, 1.
- ⁶⁶ Carson, "Martin Luther," 452.

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